| | |
| The conflict in Colombia has been inherited from generations past, since the early 19th Century’s struggle for independence from the Spanish. After which the Bolivar’s and Santander’s synonymous with the Conservatives and Liberals parties’ were at it again; ideological differences and conflict. These differences gave rise to “The War of a Thousand Days” and “La Violencia” that claimed hundreds of thousands of people’s lives. To date, conflict has mutated and violence has become part of Colombia’s contemporary history which is depicted with descriptions of murder, rape, assassinations, torture, kidnaps, ransoms and drugs. Multiple actors are involved including; paramilitary groups, guerrilla organizations, government security forces and their allies, drug lords, and organized and petty criminals. This paper analyses the armed conflict between the government and the FARC insurgency in Colombia; tracing the root causes of the conflict, the parties to the conflict and its impact on the society. Additionally, conflict management, resolution and transformation strategies are explored. Limitations of time ,space and length of the research paper are taken into consideration. This paper does not at all depict an in-depth analysis due to the above limitations as well as the complexity of the conflict. | |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HISTORY AND CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT
CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES AND PRACTISES
“Revolution is a serious thing, the most serious thing about a revolutionary life. When one commits oneself to the struggle, it must be for a lifetime.”
-FARC founding father Manuel “Tiro Firo” Valez.
"What we learned about running death squads and propping up corrupt governments in Latin America and how to apply it to other places".
-The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004)
INTRODUCTION
Geographically, Colombia is situated in Northern South America, bordering the Caribbean Sea, between Panama and Venezuela, and bordering the North Pacific Ocean, between Ecuador and Panama. [1]It is the 26th largest country in the world with an estimated population of 48 million people and having mixed and diverse ethnic groups composed of mestizo 58%, white 20%, mulato 20%, black 4%, mixed black-Ameridian 3% and Ameridian 1%.[2]
After achieving its independence from Spain, Colombia experienced numerous civil confrontations and uprisings. By the middle of the century, religious, economic and political powers were concentrated in a handful of families. There were reactions against the oligarchic society's hierarchic racism like the 1841 war in which slaves and indigenous peoples rebelled against their masters.[3] It is apparent that different classes emerged after independence in Colombia; landowners and surfs, hence the rift between the “haves” and “have not” culminating into wars reflecting a confrontation between the privileged and the underclass. Seemingly, economic wealth and resources were concentrated in the economic and political class.
The conflict in Colombia is one which is characterised by an often extreme and perceptible direct violence on the surface, with an underlying structural violence based on the inequitable distribution of wealth, extreme poverty, impunity, stigmatisation, and injustice[4] In the course of this conflict, civilians have borne the brunt of the violence.
HISTORY AND CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT
From the Spanish rule to the period of nation state formation and building of present-day Colombia, many of the rural and political structural problems of the colonial past deepened. The 19th and 20th century saw the violent confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative Parties .these confrontations were over the extent and pace of economic and social modernization and the role of the Catholic Church., as well as struggles over land, rivalries between different regions and population centers, racial conflicts and confrontations between families or groups of families. The traditional parties functioned as two opposed but complementary federations of local and regional clientelist power networks, serving as bridges between the central authorities of the state and the local and regional realities. In other areas state presence was only made possible with the concentration of land ownership. Therefore, the differing degree of consolidation of state institutions led to diverse expressions of violence in different local contexts.
POLITICAL CAUSES
Colombia is the case of a long tradition of a two-party-system between the Liberal and Conservative Party,[5] in which their relation has been characterised by power disputes drawing partisans into violent struggles[6]. These struggles were sometimes sporadic but the most violent of these power struggles was caused by the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the leader of the Liberal Party in 1948, and precipitated a partisan civil war. This was the start of ‘La Violencia’ (1948-1958)[7]These led to approximately 200,000 people were murdered and two million peasants were forced to abandon their land[8] causing armed peasant uprisings. Thereafter, rural Liberal and Communist groups formed campesino self-defence guerrilla groups which the Conservatives fought with counter-guerrilla units and hired assassins. This violence took a slippery slope that could not be contained by the central government. The violence escalated, human rights abuses were rampant. These grievances, ideological differences and endemic violence would intertwine to create an intractable conflict in Colombia with underlying issues of; justice, rights, legitimacy, unmet human needs and high stake distributional issues. In such intractable conflicts, over the course of conflict, the original issues can even become irrelevant as new causes for conflict are generated by actions within the conflict itself. Those on opposing sides come to view each other as enemies and may resort to highly destructive means. Eventually, the parties become unable to separate different issues and may see no way out of the conflict other than through total victory or defeat.[9]This stage of the conflict may have been the best for national reconciliation, healing. and nation building A power-sharing agreement was signed between the Liberal and Conservative Party that became the National Front (1958-1974).[10]During this time the military gained political autonomy with ‘timid political guidelines for [its] role in society’, in order to handle public order[11] The bipartisan system was consolidated concentrating power to the elite and reducing the opportunities for alternative political parties, like communists to join the political arena. Meanwhile, the state became inefficient and less able to provide even basic services in many parts of the country, and further lacked a cohesive control over its national territory[12]. Eventually, landless peasants declared isolated rural areas throughout the country as ‘independent republics’, trying to free themselves from the elitist national Government and as a response to the unequal distribution of land[13] This prompted the Government to counter this by launching military attacks on the ‘independent republics’ condemning them politically, blocking them economically, and taking back land. With legitimate channels closed off, many Colombians resorted to violence, in the form of left-wing guerrilla groups, to gain their objectives [14]. In this context revolutionary guerrilla movements appeared in the 1960s, due as much to the persistence of the campesinos' problems as to the increasing radicalization of university students and the urban middle classes. From this the Cuban-inspired National Liberation Army (ELN) was formed in 1964 by middle class students and intellectuals, trade unionists and former Liberal guerrilla members. In 1967 the Maoist-influenced Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was created as the armed wing of the Leninist Communist Party. The self-defence groups influenced by the Communist Party in peripheral areas of campesino colonization transformed into the guerrilla group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1966, after they had been attacked by the Army. In 1972, the more urban 19 April Movement (M-19) was formed in reaction to perceived electoral fraud in 1970.[15] The response from the state was a military campaign that at present is still ongoing. The causes of the conflict are quite intertwined into the grand political economy of the state.
ECONOMIC CAUSES
Monopoly of power, means of production, land ownership and capital accumulation in the politically and economic class created a classical Marxist state paradigm that would therefore lead to a revolution.
Poverty was rife and widespread poverty that persists, with more than 50% of the population subsisting in less than 2 dollar a day. Unequal distribution of income, resources, and wide disparity of income within Colombian population. For instance Colombia has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the entire South American continent. Widespread and unprecedented rising rate of unemployment and underemployment especially amongst the youth(s). Economic deterioration triggered by a drop in coffee prices and exacerbated by inflationary government policies since World War II[16] . The underpinnings of which were exploitation of the peasants by huge landowners: poor peasants banded together as campasinos as well as self defence groups mutating thereafter in guerilla units and rebel groups. Since the land issue is also at the fore, territorial expansion of the armed actors. The guerrillas develop in peripheral areas of campesino colonization, expanding towards:
(1) richer areas, more integrated economically into national and international markets, that coexist with marginalized pockets of colonos, and which are regulated by semi-autonomous local and regional powers;
(2) areas undergoing rapid economic expansion, with little state presence, coexisting with groups of colonos who do not have access to the new wealth nor the mediation of social conflicts by a state supplanted by the local social hierarchies;
(3) previously prosperous and integrated campesino areas with a degree of institutional presence and social regulation by local and regional powers, but where there is economic decline, a breakdown in social cohesion and regulation and the diminishing institutional presence of the state. An example is the coffee-producing region, seriously affected by the international coffee price crisis.[17]
In contrast, the paramilitaries appear in areas that are relatively prosperous and integrated with the national and global economy, and where semi-autonomous and partially consolidated local and regional powers exist. [18] The conflict was transformed in early 1980’s with the rise of the drug-export boom and the emergence of a third armed actor: the right-wing paramilitaries[19] . The drug trade led to a worsening of agrarian conflicts on the countryside as narco-investors purchased large estates in traditional cattle and agricultural areas as a way to launder money, and expelled peasants believed to sympathise with the guerrillas. By the 1990’s, the drug trade had become a principal way of financing for both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries [20].This was the economics of the conflict, arms as well as narco finance.
The conflict had adverse negative consequences for society and socioeconomic problems increased hence widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Good education and social amenities were all accessible by the rich and inaccessible for the rest who were mainly the poor. The countries human capital was severely affected too as able youth life expectancy were low.
U.S INTERVENTION
The role of the US Colombia relation dates back to the 19th century. Numerous US-owned companies had located their activities and production on Colombian soil thus linking the interests of the US in Colombia with the interests of these companies. The ties with the US were of great importance for the Colombian economy. The US market was the primary destination for Colombia’s main export and source of revenues, coffee, during the 19th and first decades of the 20th century. Later in the 20th century Colombia became the principal recipient for US aid, strengthening the relations between the two countries.In 2006 alone the US funded up to $751.0 million ($612.5 million, or 82 percent, military and police aid; the rest economic and social aid)[21] to Colombia; for different agenda and countering drug trafficking and trade being the premise. Plan Colombia was thereafter conceived but failed.. However, the growth in drug production and trade to the US during the 1970s and 1980s caused tensions between the US and Colombia [22]Foreign Military Financing and Training as well as training in counterinsurgency and terrorism of Colombian soldiers and paramilitaries in SOA (School of the Americas) just served to escalate the conflict further.
The Colombian conflict has a multiplicity of actors. The U.S heavy military financing of the Colombian army and intelligence services serves to shore up Game theory security dilemmas between Colombia and its arch rival Venezuela. Venezuela through funds Colombian rebels like the FARC. In recent times President Hugo Chavez has by rhetoric declared war on Colombia if they allow seven US military bases commence, some of which are right at the border with Venezuela.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES AND PRACTISES
A number of Peace agreements have been signed between the FARC and different Colombian governments in power. In most cases there was no good will and trust by the Government. In the 90s the FARC decided to commence on political solutions and hence created the UP(Union Patrotica),they vied for parliament positions as well as presidential contenders. The government forces as well as the paramilitaries went on a scorched earth policy both to the FARC as well as UPC partisan members. Steves Dudley (2004) estimates that the party members assassinated in the first two years of the parties formation were 500 as well as UPC presidential candidate and eventually 4,000 members. This characteristic being political genocide in international legal terms.
If Colombia is to end the almost half-century-old FARC conflict, the government should take urgent steps to:
· sustain military pressure but undertake serious efforts to complement it with a strategy for establishing peace negotiations with the still-functioning FARC Secretariat, while seeking to prevent criminalized FARC fragments from joining with organized criminal and paramilitary successor groups;
· keep all options open for swiftly freeing the FARC’s remaining hostages, including in a hostages-for-prisoners swap. The numbers and character of any FARC prisoners released should depend on the ultimate release of all hostages in FARC captivity, including hundreds held for ransom, and a rebel agreement to end kidnapping;
· renew and energise efforts to hold direct talks with the FARC Secretariat, while considering international facilitation by governments such as Brazil and possibly Chile to establish communication channels and build confidence; and
· boost efforts to expand rule of law across the country, strongly improve protection of human rights and increase citizen security through effective consolidation of accountable state presence in Colombia’s regions.[23]
Additionally, the parties to the conflict must stress the need to:
· ensure that a future model of conflict resolution harnesses greater public participation
· ensure respect for human rights
· build consensus and commitment to the negotiating agenda
· strengthen constructive international cooperation and improve democratic processes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arnson C., J., Bermúdez, J., Echeverri, D., Henifin, D., Suárez, A., R., and Valencia L., (2006) ‘Colombia’s Peace Process: Multiple Negotiations, Multiple Actors’ Latin American program Special Report, December 2006, Woodrow Wilson Centre Special Report http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/lap_colombia1.pdf
Bailey, N. A., (1967) La Violencia in Colombia, Journal of Inter-American Studies, 9:4
Buitrago, F. L., (2004) Armed actors in the Colombian conflict, in Koonings, K., Krujit, D., Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America, (London: Zed Books Ltd.) pp. 87-105
Boudon, L., (1996) ‘Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process’, Journal of Latin American Studies
Central Intelligence Agency; The World Fact Book .Colombia. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html on 4/27/2010.
Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz(1988) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/38.htm U.S. aid to Colombia today: a quick walk-through (2006) Retrived from: The Centre for International Policys’, The Colombia program website http://www.cipcol.org/?p=160 on 4/30/2010
Ebel, R. H., Taras R., Cochrane J., D., (1991) Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America: Case Studies from the Circum-Caribbean Examiner, ‘FARC guerrillas charged with conspiracy to aid foreign terrorists’ written by Jim Kouri, Publication online: 2009 April 28th, Available at: http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2009m4d28-FARC-guerrillas-charged-with-conspiracy-to-aid-foreign-terrorists Accessed: April 28th 2009
Ending Colombia's FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card(26 Mar 2009 ) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Latin America Report N°30http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/030-ending-colombias-farc-conflict-dealing-the-right-card.aspx
Fernán E. G., (2004) The Colombian conflict in historical perspective Retrieved 4/30/2010 from website; Conciliation Resources: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/historical-perspective.php
Garry L, .(1999) Colombia Journal, ‘Fifty Years of Violence’ , Retrieved from http://www.colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence.htm on April 29th 2009.
Hanratty D, Meditz S, (1988), “Colombia: A Country Study”, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, available online at http://countrystudies.us/colombia/
Heiberg, M., O’Leary B., Tirman J., (2007) Terror, insurgency, and the state: ending protracted conflicts
Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. R., (1995) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America
Peter Coleman, "Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Towards the Development of a Meta-Framework. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/ on 4/29/2010.
Scotsman (2008) ‘Dollar Wins Decades Old War Against FARC Rebels’ written by Jeremy McDermott in Bogota, published 8th November 2008,http://news.scotsman.com/world/Dollar-wins-decades-old-war.4674304.jp
Red des Derehos Humanos en Colombia. .Conflict History. Retrieved from http://colhrnet.igc.org/index.htm on 4/27/2010
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights. Colombia Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Pages/COIndex.aspx
Schmidt, S. W., (1974) ‘La Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 6:1
[1] Central Intelligence Agency; The World Fact Book .Colombia. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/co.html on 4/27/2010.
[2] Ibid......
[3] Red des Derehos Humanos en Colombia. .Conflict History. Retrieved from http://colhrnet.igc.org/index.htm on 4/27/2010
[4] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights. Colombia Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/LACRegion/Pages/COIndex.aspx
[5] Bailey, N. A., (1967) La Violencia in Colombia, Journal of Inter-American Studies, 9:4
[6] Schmidt, S. W., (1974) ‘La Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 6:1
[7] Arnson C., J., Bermúdez, J., Echeverri, D., Henifin, D., Suárez, A., R., and Valencia L., (2006) ‘Colombia’s Peace Process: Multiple Negotiations, Multiple Actors’ Latin American program Special Report, December 2006, Woodrow Wilson Centre Special Report http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/lap_colombia1.pdf
[8] Scotsman (2008) ‘Dollar Wins Decades Old War Against FARC Rebels’ written by Jeremy McDermott in Bogota, published 8th November 2008,http://news.scotsman.com/world/Dollar-wins-decades-old-war.4674304.jp
[9] Peter Coleman, "Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Towards the Development of a Meta-Framework. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/ on 4/29/2010.
[10] Ebel, R. H., Taras R., Cochrane J., D., (1991) Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America: Case Studies from the Circum-Caribbean Examiner, ‘FARC guerrillas charged with conspiracy to aid foreign terrorists’ written by Jim Kouri, Publication online: 2009 April 28th, Available at: http://www.examiner.com/x-2684-Law-Enforcement-Examiner~y2009m4d28-FARC-guerrillas-charged-with-conspiracy-to-aid-foreign-terrorists Accessed: April 28th 2009
[11] Buitrago, F. L., (2004) Armed actors in the Colombian conflict, in Koonings, K., Krujit, D., Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America, (London: Zed Books Ltd.) pp. 87-105
[12] Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. R., (1995) Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America
[13]Garry L, .(1999) Colombia Journal, ‘Fifty Years of Violence’ , Retrieved from http://www.colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence.htm on April 29th 2009.
[14] Boudon, L., (1996) ‘Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process’, Journal of Latin American Studies
[15] Fernán E. G., (2004) The Colombian conflict in historical perspective Retrieved 4/30/2010 from website; Conciliation Resources: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/historical-perspective.php
[16] Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz(1988) http://countrystudies.us/colombia/38.htm
[17] Fernán E. G., (2004) The Colombian conflict in historical perspective Retrieved 4/30/2010 from website; Conciliation Resources: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/colombia/historical-perspective.php
[18] Ibid…….
[19] Heiberg, M., O’Leary B., Tirman J., (2007) Terror, insurgency, and the state: ending protracted conflicts
[20] Ibid.....
[21] U.S. aid to Colombia today: a quick walk-through (2006) Retrived from: The Centre for International Policys’, The Colombia program website http://www.cipcol.org/?p=160 on 4/30/2010
[22] Hanratty D, Meditz S, (1988), “Colombia: A Country Study”, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, available online at http://countrystudies.us/colombia/
